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ABSTRACT 
Brorsen, B.W. and Adesina, A.A., 1990. A test of whether millet acreage in Niger is deter- 
mined by official or private market prices. Agric. Econ., 4: 287 - 296. 
Niger has two separate marketing channels for grain: one is the official system operated 
by the government; the other is a parallel channel of private traders. Researchers or policy- 
makers wanting to study effects of price policies on producers are faced with two sets of 
prices. This paper seeks to answer the question, which prices matter? Non-nested hypothesis 
tests are conducted for millet-acreage response equations. The results show that prices from 
the larger private market are the prices that matter. 
Introduction 
Niger has an official grain market operated by the Office de Produits 
Vivriers du Niger (OPVN) and a parallel grain-marketing channel of private 
traders. The OPVN, set up in 1970 as the officially recognized grain- 
marketing agency, is an official monopoly for the marketing of grains in 
Niger (Enger, 1979; Cullen and Waldstein, 1983; Scott et al., 1983; Adesina, 
1985). The activities of the OPVN include (a) setting uniform nationwide 
producer prices, (b) setting uniform nationwide consumer prices, and (c) 
balancing grain supplies between the six agricultural departments in Niger. 
In doing this, the OPVN subsidizes the transportation of grains from the 
major grain-production zones (Maradi and Zinder) to all parts of the coun- 
try. The private grain-marketing channel, although not officially recogniz- 
ed, is an important part of the marketing system. The government of Niger, 
although aware of its existence, allows it to operate. This network of private 
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traders controls a major share of the total volume of grains marketed in 
Niger. Elliot Berg Associates (1983) estimated that the OPVN handles bet- 
ween 15% and 35% of the grain marketed in Niger. Borsdorf (1979) 
estimated that the official market handles 15% of total grains marketed. 
The reason for the low market share of the OPVN is that the uniform pro- 
ducer prices are set lower than the corresponding prices on the private grain 
markets (Cullen and Waldstein, 1983; Proulx et al., 1983; Elliot Berg 
Associates, 1983; Adesina, 1985). How relevant are the OPVN prices in 
grain production? Opinions of researchers vary from that of non-relevance 
to scepticism. Borsdorf (1979) contends that grain production is not respon- 
sive to the official prices. Maina (1982), in an econometric estimation of pro- 
duction responses, asserted that Nigerien farmers do not respond to official 
market prices. The study concluded that farmers grow crops to satisfy sub- 
sistence requirements. However, Adesina (1985), in a mathematical- 
programming analysis of grain production, indicated that farmers should 
generate marketed surpluses, given the adoption of fertilizer technology. 
The study indicated that private market prices should be important in pro- 
duction and marketing decisions. Maina (1982) estimated acreage responses 
econometrically using only official producer prices, while Adesina and 
Brorsen (1987) estimated acreage response using private-market prices. 
Although past research has argued for or against the relevant prices, no 
attempt has been made to determine which prices affect acreage decisions. 
The objective of this study is to test whether Nigerien millet farmers respond 
to private market prices and/or official prices. These hypotheses are tested 
using non-nested hypotheses tests. Given the different views on which prices 
are relevant for producers, non-nested test procedures are appropriate in 
testing for the relevant prices in grain production (Godfrey and Pesaran, 
1983). Policy-makers in Niger need information about the relevant prices in 
grain-producers’ decisions. Such information can be useful in designing of- 
ficial pricing policies. 
Theoretical model 
Millet is the major crop in Niger, accounting for 85% of the total area 
cultivated in 1983. The other crops - sorghum, cowpeas and peanuts - repre- 
sent a small fraction of total production. Sorghum and cowpea acreage were 
10% and 8% respectively of total acreage cultivated in 1983. Peanuts have 
become a minor crop. Only millet acreage equations are considered in this 
study, since millet is the most widely cultivated crop. Sorghum is grown on 
higher-quality land, and thus only cowpeas and millet compete for the same 
land. 
Let Yj u = 1, . . ., n) represent he output of the n crops produced on 
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the farm, and Xjk (k = 1, . . ., K) represent he quantity of input k used 
in production of crop j. The fixed amount of land available for production 
is X1. The assumption of a fixed quantity of land is appropriate for Niger, 
where most of the land is sandy and the amount of arable land is limited. 
The production possibility set for the farm can be written following 
Varian (1982) as: 
Y(X) = [X y: F(X) >, r; x, = X1] (1) 
where Y(x) represents the restricted production possibility set with a fixed 
amount of land available for production. 
Following Just et al. (1983), p. 772), inputs are assumed to be allocatable 
among production activities (i.e., inputs used in producing Y, do not affect 
the production of Y2). Thus, the production technology derived from (1) 
can be written as: 
yj = fj txlj, X2j3 * * - 9 xkjl j = 1,. . .) n 
and (2) 
n 
xk = j c 1 xkj k = 1,. . .,K 
The derived production function in (2) will display decreasing returns to 
scale since the amount of one input (land) is limited (Varian, 1982, p. 20). 
Various researchers have argued that the grain-marketing system in Niger 
satisfies the requirements of a competitive market (Kohler, 1977; Elliot Berg 
Associates, 1983). Elliot Berg Associates (1983) asserted that ‘the structural 
characteristics of Niger’s markets give a strong presumption of com- 
petitiveness. There exist many buyers and sellers, and barriers to entry are 
few.’ Therefore, the farmer can be viewed as a profit maximizer, operating 
with perfectly elastic output and input markets. Let Pj (,j = 1, . . ., n) 
represent crop prices at harvest. The farmer’s decision can then be 
represented as: 
where Cji 1 PjYj represents the total revenue from all the crops produced, 
and C,:, WkXk represents the total variable costs of production. The 
firstorder conditions for this maximization problem yield the unconditional 
output supply and input demand equations: 
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- 
j = 1, . . ., n (3) 
k = 2,. . .,K 
Xj* = Fj(P1) P2, a . v, Pn, Xl, W2, e a e, W,> j = 1, . . ., n (4) 
Equation (3) is the input or factor demand function, while (4) is the supply 
function. Since we are investigating acreage decisions, (3) is the relevant por- 
tion of the farmer’s maximization problem. The farmer decides on the 
acreage of the crops to cultivate, based on market output prices and factor 
prices. Equation (3) is used to specify the acreage demand equation for 
millet. 
The question addressed in this paper is, what set of prices are relevant? 
Alternative specifications of millet acreage demand equations are specified, 
using official and private market output prices. The major inputs in grain 
production are labor and fertilizer. Labor constraints during the critical 
weeding periods have been found to limit millet production in Niger 
(Adesina, 1985). No satisfactory price for labor could be obtained, and so 
price of labor could not be included. Fertilizer is important in grain produc- 
tion (Reeser, 1980; Adesina, 1985). Soils in Niger are low in nitrogen (N) and 
phosphorous (P). Most fertilizer is applied as simple superphosphate (P) or 
urea (N). Jomini (1989) found that phosphorous limits yields when rainfall 
is not a constraint. Therefore, the price of simple superphosphate is used as 
the price of fertilizer. 
Empirical model specifications and non-nested hypothesis testing 
procedures: 
Based on the previous theoretical considerations, the following alternative 
empirical model specifications are hypothesized for the millet acreage de- 
mand equations. These equations are estimated with ordinary least squares: 
AM, = a0 + aI OMP, + a2 OCPt + a3 FD, + eI, (5) 
AM, = b, + b, PMPt_l + b, PCPt_l + b, FD, + e2* (6) 
where AMY is the acreage of millet harvested in time period t (1000 ha), OMPt 
official millet price at time t (FCFA/kg), OCP, official cowpea price at time 
t (FCFA/kg), PMP,_ 1 private market price for millet at time t - 1, 
(FCFA/kg), PCP,_ 1 private market price for cowpeas at time t- 1 
(FCFA/kg), and FD~ official fertilizer price at time t (FCFA/kg of P,O,). 
Equation (5) specifies millet acreage as a function of official market grain 
prices (i.e., OPVN prices), and fertilizer price. The alternative model 
specifies acreage as a function of private market output prices, and fertilizer 
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price. Neither equation is a special case of the other and, therefore, non- 
nested testing procedures can be used (Pesaran, 1980; Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1981; MacKinnon et al., 1983). 
A number of statistics have been proposed to test non-nested hypothesis 
tests (Cox, 1961, 1962; Pesaran, 1974; Pesaran and Deaton, 1978; Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1981; Godfrey and Pesaran, 1983). These tests include the 
Cox Non-Nested Test (Cox, 1961, 1962), the J-test (Davidson and MacKin- 
non, 1981), the orthodox test and the Adjusted Cox Test (Godfrey and 
Pesaran, 1983). Non-nested tests allow rejecting or accepting both alter- 
native model specifications. Let the first hypothesis (Hr) be that official 
prices are the relevant prices in millet production. Let the second hypothesis 
(Hz) be that private market prices are the relevant ones in production. 
The orthodox test is the least powerful of the three tests. For the J-test 
procedure, the predicted values in equation (5) and equation (6) are obtain- 
ed. The predicted values from these equations are denoted by a,, and a,,, 
respectively. To perform the J-test: a,, is included as an additional ex- 
planatory variable in (6), while d,r is included as an additional explanatory 
variable in (5). A t-test is used to test the coefficients on A,, and A,,. 
Suppose the coefficient on a,, in the millet acreage equation specified 
with official market prices is statistically significant, while the coefficient on 
A,, in the alternate model is not significant. The conclusion will be to re- 
ject the official price specification and fail to reject the private market price 
specification (i.e., private market prices are the relevant prices in millet 
acreage decisions). 
In this study, the two test procedures used are the J-test and the Cox non- 
nested test procedures. Monte Carlo studies have shown that the J-test has 
low power in small samples (Godfrey and Pesaran, 1983). The Cox non- 
nested test may reject more often than it should in small samples. The two 
tests are used in this study because of the possible fragility of results to alter- 
native test procedures. The data for crop area and private market output 
prices were obtained from the Niger Ministry of Rural Development Rap- 
port Annuel Statistiques (1976, 1981, 1986) and the FAO Production Year- 
books (1970 - 1982). The official market prices are from Elliot Berg 
Associates (1983). The data for the retail price index used in deflating the 
output and input prices were obtained from International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 1988) and World Tables (World Bank 1976). Fertilizer prices are from 
the FAO Fertilizer Yearbook (1978 - 1986). Exchange rates to convert some 
of the fertilizer data to the Niger currency are from International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 1988). 
Data from different sources are not perfectly consistent. This is especially 
true for the fertilizer price data. To aid later researchers in reproducing the 
results, the data used in the study are displayed in Table 1. The private- 
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market prices shown in the table are substantially higher than the official 
prices. The private-market millet and cowpea prices are calendar average 
prices for Niamey, which is basically a retail market. Private-market prices 
away from Niamey would be less due to transportation costs and marketing 
margins. In most, but not all, years official market prices were the same at 
all locations. Prices in Niger are also highly seasonal. Thus, even though the 
private-market prices shown in Table 1 are substantially larger than official 
prices, official prices could still be higher during the seasonal ow following 
harvest or in remote areas. 
Empirical model results and discussion 
Use of the private market gives estimates of the structural parameters con- 
sistent with theoretical expectations (Table 2). In the official price acreage 
equation, neither coefficient on the lagged official prices is statistically 
significant. Millet and cowpeas are competing crops in production. 
Economic theory suggests that the cross-price effect between millet acreage 
and price of cowpeas should be negative. 
Based on the correct signs on the coefficients of the explanatory variables, 
TABLE 1 
Acreage and price data for Niger, 1972- 1983 
Year Acreage Private Private Official Official Fertilizer Retail 
millet millet cowpea millet cowpea price = price inex 
harvested price price price price (FCFA/kg (1980 = 
(1000 ha) (FCFA/kg) (FCFA/kg) (FCFA/kg) (FCFA/kg) P,O,) 100) 
1971 2356 29.5 45 10 20 105.9 36.4 
1972 2370 45.9 60 13 20 111.8 40.0 
1973 2007 45.4 72 25 25 111.8 44.7 
1974 2230 37.5 90 25 40 123.1 46.2 
1975 1623 45.7 74 25 40 93.3 50.4 
1976 2527 60.7 64 25 40 117.0 62.3 
1977 2728 81.8 82 25 30 98.3 76.8 
1978 2747 96.3 123 35 30 85.0 84.5 
1979 2922 91.5 102 40 45 100.0 90.7 
1980 3072 97.0 123 40 45 106.1 100.0 
1981 3037 178.0 246 45 45 143.1 122.9 
1982 3066 167.0 246 70 90 184.2 137.2 
1983 3135 113.0 210 80 85 175.0 133.8 
FCFA, 275.02 French Community Francs per Standard Drawing Rate (1980 conversion 
code). 
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it seems the private-market price specification is more appropriate for 
modelling millet acreage demand decisions. The two non-nested hypotheses 
considered are: 
HI: The official price specification provides sufficient information in ex- 
plaining acreage decisions. 
H,: The private-market price specification provides sufficient information 
in explaining millet acreage decisions. 
Using the J-test procedure the official price specification is rejected at the 
10% level (5070 level if a one-tailed test is used), but the private price 
specification could not be rejected. This implies that the private-market 
price specification has important information relevant in explaining acreage 
decisions. To validate this conclusion, an alternative test procedure - the 
Cox Non-Nested Test - is used. The test statistics, which have an asymp- 
totic Z-distribution for official and private markets, are - 0.29 and - 4.42, 
respectively. The conclusion is the same as for the J-test. The implication is 
that private-market prices provide important information in explaining 
millet acreage decisions and that official market prices are not necessary to 
explain acreage decisions. 
The elasticity of millet acreage demand to market prices is important for 
policy analyses in Niger. The millet acreage elasticities with respect to private 
market prices are 0.53 for millet prices and -0.33 for cowpea prices. This 
inelastic response of millet acreage to price may be due to technological con- 
straints in production. The amount of arable land in Niger is limited. Since 
the available fertile land is already in use, acreage is increased by cultivating 
less-fertile land. Long-run acreage elasticity estimates from Maina (1982) 
(official price elasticities) were 0.03 for millet prices. The supply elasticity 
computed from yield and area elasticities was 0.06. This study’s results in- 
dicate that Nigerien farmers are more responsive to market prices than was 
asserted by Maina (1982). 
Summary and conclusions 
This study was undertaken to determine whether Nigerian millet pro- 
ducers respond to private market prices and/or official market prices. Alter- 
native specifications of millet acreage equations were hypothesized and non- 
nested hypothesis test procedures were used to test the hypotheses. The 
model with official market prices was rejected, and the null hypothesis that 
private market prices were sufficient for explaining acreage demand could 
not be rejected. The private market specification also gave results closer to 
theoretical expectations than did the official market specification. 
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The conclusion from this study is that private market prices are relevant 
for Nigerian millet production. Past research has often not considered the 
role of these prices in grain production. In specifying millet acreage equa- 
tions, researchers may need to consider only private market prices. Farmers 
respond to private market prices rather than official market prices. 
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